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Abstract
A growing empirical literature has shown, based on structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) 
identifi ed through sign restrictions, that unconventional monetary policies implemented after 
the outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) had expansionary macroeconomic effects. 
In a recent paper, Elbourne and Ji (2019) conclude that these studies fail to identify true 
unconventional monetary policy shocks in the euro area. In this note, we show that their 
fi ndings are actually fully consistent with a successful identifi cation of unconventional monetary 
policy shocks by the earlier studies and that their approach does not serve the purpose of 
evaluating identifi cation strategies of SVARs.
Keywords: unconventional monetary policy, SVARs.
JEL classifi cation: C32, E30, E44, E51, E52.
Resumen
Diversos estudios empíricos han demostrado, basándose en autorregresiones vectoriales 
estructurales (SVAR) identifi cadas mediante restricciones de signo, que las políticas 
monetarias no convencionales implementadas después del estallido de la crisis fi nanciera 
global tuvieron efectos macroeconómicos expansivos. En un artículo reciente, Elbourne 
y Ji (2019) concluyen, por el contrario, que estos estudios no logran identifi car verdaderos 
shocks de política monetaria no convencional en la zona del euro. En este documento 
mostramos que sus hallazgos son en realidad totalmente coherentes con una identifi cación 
exitosa de los shocks de política monetaria no convencional de los estudios anteriores, 
y que su enfoque no sirve para evaluar estrategias de identifi cación de modelos SVAR.
Palabras clave: política monetaria no convencional, modelos SVAR.
Códigos JEL: C32, E30, E44, E51, E52.
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1. Introduction 
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???? ??????? ???????? ????? "these findings result from an identification strategy that does not 
successfully uncover unconventional monetary policy shocks"???
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????"Not only is it highly implausible 
that the identification scheme of Gambacorta et al. (2014), Boeckx et al. (2017) and Burriel and 
Galesi (2018) recovers the true unconventional monetary policy shocks without the information 
contained in the size of the ECB's balance sheet, the resultant shocks bear no resemblance to 
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other credibly identified monetary policy shocks in this period. As such, the logical conclusion is 
that the SVAR models are not identifying unconventional monetary policy shocks."?
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2. Revisiting the effects of unconventional monetary policy in the euro area 
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2.1. The VAR model of Boeckx et al. (2017) 
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2.2. Sign switch of the balance sheet restriction 
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2.4. Low correlation with shocks identified from futures rate surprises 
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